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We herein investigate the observed discrepancy between real and perceived commercial risks associated 
with the use of genetically modified (GM) products in developing countries. We focus particularly on the 
effects of GM-free private standards set up by food companies in Europe and other countries on 
biotechnology and biosafety policy decisions in food-exporting developing countries.  
Based on field visits made to South Africa, Namibia, and Kenya in June 2007, and secondary 
information from the press and various publications, we find 31 cases of interactions between private 
GM-free standards and biosafety policy decisions in 21 countries. Although we cannot infer the direct 
involvement of supermarkets and food companies in biosafety policy processes in developing countries, 
we find that by setting up GM-free standards, these actors are indirectly influential via their local traders, 
who face the possibility of exclusion if they do not comply with the standards. Organic producers’ and 
anti-GM organizations also play a role in spreading perceptions of commercial risks that are not always 
justified.  
By comparing cases, we differentiate three types of relevant commercial risks: real risks, 
potential risks, and unproven risks. We then identify two critical, yet misleading, presumptions 
perpetuated by the various interest groups to spread the fear of potential or unproven risks: the 
infeasibility of non-GM product segregation and the lack of alternative buyers. We also find that 
information asymmetries and risk-averse behaviors related to perceived market power can help insert 
unfounded export concerns into biosafety or biotechnology policy decisions. The results of our analysis 
are used to suggest a simple framework to separate real commercial risks from others, based on five 
critical questions designed to aid decision makers when they face pressures to reject GM crop testing, 
application, consumption or use for fear of alleged export losses. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Over a decade after their introduction, genetically modified (GM) crops are still largely produced in only 
a few countries. In particular, many developing countries have avoided entering the debate on GM crops, 
observing conflicting views among developed countries between exporters promoting the use of the 
technology and importers strictly regulating it. Generally lacking functional biosafety systems, they have 
adopted a de facto wait-and-see position, in part due to perceived potential risks associated with the use of 
transgenic crops and their derived products.  
Policy specialists have identified several factors playing a role in the reluctance of these countries 
to develop or adopt their biosafety policies and regulations. Notably, perceived commercial risks resulting 
from the potential loss of market access to targeted developed countries with strict import and marketing 
regulations for GM food is considered a significant factor in a number of countries (Paarlberg 2002, 
Gruère 2006a). In particular, the fear of losing agricultural exports to Europe has been used to support the 
observed political standstill on adopting GM technology in a number of African and Asian countries. 
At the same time, applied research conducted in the area of GM products and international trade 
has consistently shown that the alleged commercial risks for currently approved GM crops are largely 
exaggerated, and that the potential export losses these countries could incur with them would be limited if 
not negligible compared with the potential productivity gains from adopting targeted GM crops. For 
instance, Paarlberg (2006) showed that Eastern and Southern African countries have very low export 
volumes going towards the GM- adverse markets of Europe. Smyth et al. (2006) showed that the United 
States (US) and Canada, despite being large adopters of GM crops and facing a moratorium on GM maize 
in the European Union (EU), have not decreased exports of GM crops. Several studies using international 
trade simulations have also demonstrated that developing countries would gain a great deal and not lose 
much if they adopted productivity-enhancing GM crops (e.g., Anderson and Jackson 2005, Gruère et al. 
2007), despite the existence of import barriers. Other studies have shown that non-adoption of 
productivity-enhancing technologies could become costly if competitors adopt such technologies (e.g. 
Elbehri and MacDonald 2004, Berwald et al. 2006).  
This observed discrepancy between the perceived and actual commercial risks, while puzzling 
and of considerable importance, has largely been left out of the GM food and trade debate. Assuming that 
policy makers are at least partially rational when assessing commercial interests, this  suggests that there 
is a distortion between the perceived and real commercial risks, supporting a bias towards a precautionary 
stand that puts any possible (even unproven) export consideration before production interests. 
Investigating this issue requires that we dive into the political economy of national biotech and biosafety 
decision making on one hand, and into the distribution and transmission of information along the supply 
chain, from the exporter to the importer, on the other.  
A closer look at the evolving global market for agricultural products suggests that private 
standards play a determining role. In recent years, modern value chains for exported commodities have 
been dominated by the demand and specific requirements of retailers in developed countries. In particular, 
many food companies in Europe, Japan, and a few other developed countries have responded to consumer 
demand by requesting that their suppliers, mainly based in developing countries, avoid GM ingredients. 
While these “GM-free” standards are not specifically different from other standards, their enforcement in 
exporting countries that are in the process of implementing policies on GM crops has created conflicts of 
interest between regulators,/developers, and traders.  
 In this paper we study the interactions between importing food companies and their GM-free 
private standards and biotechnology decision making in developing countries. Our objectives are first to 
assess the existence of observed relationships between private trade-related interests and public policies 
on biotechnology and biosafety, second to identify the critical factors explaining the observed 
disconnection between perceived and real commercial risk in decision making, and third to propose a 
guiding framework that will help avoid irrational decision making. To do so, we conduct a global review  
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of case studies linking private export-related interests and policy decisions, and analyze these cases 
according to the validity of their associated commercial risks.  
This paper is arranged in six sections. Section 2 provides some background information on the 
development of GM-free private standards. Section 3 proposes a set of hypothetical links between private 
interests and decision making for evaluation. Section 4 reviews the available global evidence.  Section 5 
provides a characterization and critical analysis of these cases and their underlying factors, and suggests a 
decision-making framework. We close the paper with some conclusions.   
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2.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF GM-FREE PRIVATE STANDARDS 
Private standards started in the area of food safety, with supermarkets and importers setting up high 
standards and traceability systems in response to the food safety scares of the 1990s in the meat and 
vegetable sectors (Graffham 2006). With consumer confidence in public regulations on the decline, 
private companies decided to self-regulate with private standards (Henson 2006; Cordon et al. 2005). 
However, these standards were gradually extended into other application areas, including non-safety 
considerations such as environmental, ethical, and labor standards. Horticulture exports from African 
countries have been particularly affected by the private standards of European retailers in this sector. The 
exports from these countries are not very important for Europe (Brown 2005), but they represent a 
significant share of their total export value (Labaste 2005; Jaffe and Masakure 2005). Therefore, 
compliance with specific import requirements on production is seen as a necessity for exporters. 
Applied research studies have shown that private standards have had mixed effects on developing 
countries. They have proven beneficial in allowing access to high-value developed- country markets. 
Several cases of costly safety-related bans with large export effects have shown that increasing food 
safety standards could be beneficial (e.g., see Henson et al. 2000; Unnevehr 2000; Swinnen and Maertens 
2006).  Some standards have also generated positive effects on production practices in developing 
countries, by improving market conditions for horticultural exports, and ensuring the safety of products 
from countries with lax food safety (Henson and Reardon 2005; Maertens and Swinnen 2006). At the 
same time, not all private standards have yielded positive outcomes. In particular, the imposition of costly 
production practices and sanitary standards that go beyond international standards have burdened 
suppliers in developing countries. Furthermore, the high level of sophistication required by these 
standards has encouraged concentration (Dolan and Humphrey 2000; Swinnen and Martens 2007) and left 
some small-scale farmers out of the picture. There is not enough evidence to suggest the long-term 
impacts of such private standards, but the short term has seen declining numbers of small-scale producers 
in the supply chain (e.g. in Kenya, see Dolan et al. 1999 and Henson et al. 2005).  
Consumers’ demand for similar quality attributes and the increasing number of suppliers in 
different countries has led to some consolidation of the standards, and a number of regional or multi-
company standard-setting bodies have emerged. A few generic standards have become common across 
companies, crowding the market and making these essentially voluntary standards de facto mandatory for 
exporters. Although a number of standards can be traced back to actual consumer demand, others have 
gone beyond consumer demand in adding new requirements on sellers each year. As a consequence of the 
growing dominance of private standards in Europe, third-party certification has gradually become a 
requirement (Hatanaka et al. 2005), and certification costs have been transferred from the retailers to the 
suppliers, adding pressure on the suppliers’ margins.  
GM-free policies were first introduced in 1996 in Europe, in response to media and activist 
campaigns against the first import of GM soybeans and their use in food products (Livermore 2007). At 
that time, GM tomato paste had been successfully marketed by Sainsbury for two years in the United 
Kingdom (UK) without any problem. However, the introduction of GM soybeans, an ingredient present in 
60% or more of all processed food, triggered a very intense campaign against GM foods, forcing 
supermarkets and companies to abandon the use of all GM ingredients (Livermore 2007). The Iceland 
supermarket company in the UK was one of the first to make this decision, but many other chains 
followed, including Sainsbury. Soon, this phenomenon caught on and became the norm for most food 
products in European supermarkets, including foods sourced from developing countries.  
While strongly supported by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) opposed to the use of 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs), these standards were also driven by genuine consumer demand. 
European consumers, on average, have maintained a negative perception about GM food since 1996. 
Several empirical studies have shown that consumers in Europe do not share the same views held by 
others (including their US counterparts) on GM food. For instance, consumers from France, Germany and 
the UK have a higher willingness than US consumers to pay for beef from cattle fed with GM-free corn  
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(Lusk et al. 2003). Consumer knowledge does not seem to be the main reason for these differences. For 
example, Hoban (1997) found that 65% of consumers in the US were aware of biotechnology, while 73% 
of the surveyed US consumers were willing to buy GM foods (Lusk et al., 2003). Comparatively, 
biotechnology awareness amongst consumers was 55% in France, 57% in the UK, and 91% in Germany. 
Negative sentiment about GM foods was the highest in Germany, where 57% viewed it as a health risk, 
while 60% and 63% of consumers in France and the UK, respectively, were willing to buy GM foods, 
with only 38 and 39% of people in France and the UK, respectively, viewing it as a health hazard (Hoban 
1997).  
Consumers in developed countries of Asia have a similar reticence towards GM food. Japan’s 
consumers traditionally have concerns related to food safety, lowering their willingness to pay for GM 
food even though these consumers have a relatively good knowledge of biotechnology (e.g., McCluskey 
et al. 2003). Korea has also maintained a low consumer acceptance of GM crops (Kim and Kim 2004).  
In this context, the marketing decision of avoiding GM ingredients in food items rapidly became 
a quality attribute employed in the competition among the retails chains of Europe, Japan and South 
Korea. A report by the international NGO, Greenpeace, which has encouraged companies to adopt GM-
free policies, provides evidence of the widespread adoption of such practices in Europe (Greenpeace 
2006), as follows: 
  Twenty-seven of the top 30 retailers have a non-GM policy in Europe. 
  Fourteen of these retailers have a policy of not selling GM-branded products under their 
company name for all European countries. These include Carrefour, Auchan, 
Sainsbury’s, Safeway, Marks & Spencer, Coop Switzerland, Coop Italia, Migros, Big 
Food Group, Somerfield, Morrison’s, Kesko, Boots, and Co-op UK. 
  Seven of these retailers have a non-GM policy for their own branded products for their 
main markets (mainly in their home countries). These include Tesco, Rewe, Metro 
Group, Casino, Edeka, Schwarz group, Tengelmann). 
  Out of the top 30 European food and drink producers, 22 have a non-GM commitment in 
Europe, including Nestle, Unilever, Coca Cola, Diageo, Kraft Foods (Altria), 
Masterfoods (Mars), Heineken, Barilla, Carlsberg, Dr. Oetker, Arla Foods, InBev 
(Interbrew), Heinz, Chiquita, Cirio del Monte, Orkla, Ferrero, Northern Foods, Eckes 
Granini, Bonduelle, Kellogg and McCain. 
  Thirteen of these 22 multinationals have a company-wide non-GM policy beyond 
Europe. These include Diageo, Heineken, Barilla, Carlsberg, Arla Foods, Dr. Oetker, 
Chiquita, Cirio del Monte, Orkla, Ferrero, Northern Foods, Eckes Granini, and 
Bonduelle. 
Some companies even go beyond banning processed products derived from GM ingredients to 
include requirements on GM-free animal feed in animal products. Table 1 shows the GM-free standards 
in place in the main retailers of the UK. Virtually all supermarkets sell only poultry fed with non-GM 
feeds, whereas the policies for dairy products, beef and pork vary.  
For supermarkets, taking the position of not having any GM products (fresh or processed) on their 
shelves may appease consumers, counter negative campaigns by NGOs, and help gain greater brand 
equity. However, for their suppliers in developing countries, complying with non-GM requirements has 
meant instituting potentially costly procedures in their production lines (if the suppliers were using GM 
products) in addition to the social and labor standard certifications already required. Furthermore, such 
requirements may have pushed some suppliers to proactively encourage politicians to avoid considering 




Table 1. Presence of a GM-free policy on branded animal products in British supermarkets 








Eggs Chicken  Turkey  Farmed 
Fish 
Marks  &  Spencer  Yes No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Co-op  No  No   Yes  Partially  Partially  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes 
Waitrose Partially  No  No  Partially  Partially  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sainsbury’s Partially  No Partially  Partially  No  Partially  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Morrison’s  No  No    No  No  Partially  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Asda  No  No   No  No  No  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes 
Somerfield  No  No  No  No  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Iceland  No  No  No  No  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tesco  No  No  No  No  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Budgens No  No  Yes  No    No  Yes  Yes  Partially  No 
Source: Friends of Earth (2006). 
In the context of developing countries, these consumer-driven standards are largely export-
related; in-country consumers, while largely unaware of biotech, do not appear to share the same negative 
perceptions of GM food (Curtis et al. 2004). Several consumer studies show that most consumers in India 
or China would be willing to buy GM food at no price difference or even at a positive premium (e.g., Li et 
al. 2002, Anand et al. 2007, Deodhar et al. 2007, Qaim and Krishna 2008). Fewer studies have been 
conducted in Africa, but the existing reports indicate similar results. In particular, Kimenju and De Groote 
(2008) show that a large majority of Kenyan consumers would be willing to buy GM maize at the same 
price as non-GM maize, while an additional third would be willing to buy it if the prices were lower than 
those for traditional maize. 
Although the existing studies on private standards analyze a wide range of standards and their 
effects on the industry, consumers, suppliers and farmers, we are unaware of any article specifically 
examining their effects on domestic public policies. Vandenbergh (2007) demonstrates the growing role 
of private standards as a substitute or alternative to public policies on global environmental governance. A 
few articles report the observed strategy of avoiding GM products in supermarkets, especially in Europe 
(e.g., Bernauer 2003, Kalaitzandonakes and Bijman 2003), and others analyze the effects of an importing 
company’s ingredient choices on their suppliers (Knight et al. 2005, Gruère 2006b). However, to our 
knowledge no published study specifically focuses on the political implications that GM-free standards 
may have on exporting countries in Africa or Asia, and how they could help explain the discrepancy 
between real and perceived commercial risks with regard to the use of GM products.  
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3.  FROM PRIVATE STANDARDS TO BIOSAFETY DECISION MAKING: A 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
Figure 1 presents a conceptual framework of the possible links between private and trade-related interests 
and biosafety policy making. The framework is based on a two-country example. The importing country 
(top) is a developed country with specific import and marketing regulations on GM food, and large food 
companies (such as a country of the EU). The second country (bottom) is a developing country that 
exports certain foods or feed products to one or more companies in the importing country, and therefore 
faces policy decisions on biosafety and/or the use of GM crops.  

























In the importing country, a large share of consumers tends to be averse to the use of GM food, 
due to the anti-GM campaigns of NGOs. Perceiving a potential risk and linking the use of GM crops to a 
number of concerns, these consumers see the lack of GM ingredients as a positive quality attribute in a 
food product. Confronted with this situation and facing requirements to label their product as GM if it 
contains any targeted ingredient, the food companies (here represented by a retail or supermarket chain) 
must decide on the use or nonuse of GM ingredients. Not only may they consider using a GM-free claim 
or standard as signal of high quality but they also have to confront the risk of reputation loss due to anti-
GM campaigns against any labeled GM product. As a consequence of these two constraints, they decide 
to avoid using any GM ingredient in their product formulation. Although they may not use a specific GM-
free private standard, they may include a quality requirement in their general standards, rejecting the use 
of GM ingredients and potentially using a non-GM labeling claim (which has the same effect as an up-
front standard).   
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In the exporting country, this GM-free private standard or clause is transmitted to the local 
traders, and from there down to the producer. Depending on the products purchased by the importer, the 
GM-free requirement can specifically focus on a potentially GM crop (e.g., corn), or on meat or animal 
products fed with GM feed, or it may more broadly cover any products derived from crops for which 
there is no available GM variety anywhere in the world. The supermarket chain may also have a retail 
partner or subchain in the country subject to the same standard; this actor could further interact with 
policy makers. Two other groups are bound to actively participate in the debate on commercial risks (if 
they are present): the anti-GM NGOs, who tend to be subsets of international NGOs based in Western 
countries, and groups or association of organic or fair trade exporting, whose regulating principles forbid 
the use of GM crops, seeds or elements thereof. 
Simultaneous to or after introduction of the private standards, we assume that the government of 
the exporting country is considering a biosafety decision. It may be discussing the adoption of a 
biotechnology policy or biosafety law (as is the case in many African countries), or it could be preparing 
to make a discrete regulatory decision on the approval or rejection of an application for one of the 
following: a) a confined GM field trial; b) importation of GM seeds or a shipment that may contain GM 
food or feed; or c) the use of food aid that may contain GM grains. Any of these decisions may be related 
to a food, feed or other crop that is targeted/not targeted by the private standard.  
As shown in Figure 1, our framework identifies five possible influential links (numbered 1 to 5) 
between the different players and the two types of policy decisions (a policy adoption noted A or discrete 
regulatory decision noted B). The first possible link would come from the direct involvement of the 
importing company in policy decision making aimed at slowing the advancement of a biosafety policy or 
rejecting an application for the use of a GM product (for a field trial, import, or food aid). This sort of 
direct involvement could be risky and might not be very effective, but it is possible. The second 
influential link would come from in-country traders who could potentially be encouraged to lobby against 
an upcoming decision- for example if the GM product in question is the same product they sell to the 
export target under a GM-free standard. The third possible link originates from producer groups that have 
adopted organic or fair trade standards. These standards are issued by certification agencies rather than 
companies, but they share a number of similarities with private standards: they have specific requirements 
for market access; they require use of specific practices under certification, with the purpose of fulfilling a 
consumer-demanded attribute; and they may be used by importing companies as a marketing tool. The 
fourth link comes from anti-GM organizations, which tend to use the risk of export losses due to the use 
of GM products as an argument for their cause. The last possible interaction could come from local 
supermarkets, potentially acting under GM-free private standards, or under threat from targeting 
campaigns by the anti-GM NGOs.  
While this framework provides a first basis for analysis, it is based on stylized facts and needs to 
be validated. The following review of the evidence aims to clarify which actors actually play roles in 
influencing policies based on proven or unproven commercial risks. Each of the supposed links will be 
evaluated based on our review of global evidence.  
From Concepts to Facts: Reviewing the Evidence 
A. Research Methods 
Due to the qualitative nature of the evidence and the politically-sensitive nature of this issue in most 
countries, it is difficult to gather primary data and facts. Thus, we base our research on a synthesis of 
several sources of primary and secondary data.  
First, we documented published and reported cases of interactions of importers with policy 
making in exporting countries, obtained via internet research. Second, we conducted phone interviews 
with people within targeted countries to determine whether there was any evidence of private standards in 
the reported cases. We also talked to a number of international biotech policy specialists based in  
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Washington DC and in Europe. Third, we visited three selected countries, South Africa, Namibia and 
Kenya, and sought to substantiate the evidence and provide case-study support.  
To select our in-country respondents, we used a semi-structured snowball sampling technique, 
whereby local partners helped us identify a few key stakeholders and provided references for contacting 
more specialized individuals. In terms of instrumentation, we conducted mostly face-to-face interviews 
with the selected stakeholders. This format was preferred because distance and time constraints made it 
difficult to conduct focus group interviews, and also because some stakeholders were concerned about the 
privacy of their statements. All interviewees were asked the same questions, as part of a short, open-
ended questionnaire. The responses were then substantiated with further questions according to the 
discussion pattern (i.e., the nature of the conversation and the stakeholder’s response to the initial set of 
questions). Several items, such as the reports on possible cases of private standards, were used as aids 
during the interviews.  
In a first best world, a more formal validation of each case, perhaps using the Ego-Alter-Research 
(EAR) methodology (Arts and Verschuren 1999), would have been appropriate. This method validates the 
presence of influence based on a pressure group’s own perception of influence (Ego), the policy 
recipient’s perception (Alter) and the perception of an outside researcher (Research), as done by Arts and 
Mack (2007) in the case of NGOs influencing international biosafety. However, in our case, lobbying is 
not an open goal for most of the involved players (instead, it is a means to an end), and the politicians 
have no incentive to reveal the real reasons behind their decisions. Policy makers will not admit to having 
been influenced and companies will not reveal whether they have tried to influence policy decisions. 
Therefore, most cases of potential influence were reported by third parties. Furthermore, it was often 
difficult to trace a reported story to its actual source. Many cases seemed to be based on rumors, with 
nobody willing to take clear responsibility for passing on the news. In other cases, the involved 
individuals were reluctant to divulge details for fear of being quoted.
1 
As a second best option, therefore, we report all relevant cases and provide the type of sources 
they are based on. While we think that most of these cases are relatively well substantiated, the reader can 
decide whether the assembled evidence makes each case credible. In the next subsection, we provide an 
overview of the reported international cases identified in our general search.  
B. Review of Reported Cases 
Table 2 presents a summary of the identified cases, indicating the location, year, product, alleged 
commercial risk and policy decision. We found at least 31 cases of reported direct or indirect interaction 
between private commercial interests and biosafety policy decisions in 21 countries. However, the actors 
involved, the scope of the interaction, its policy implication, and/or the possible causality largely vary 
from case to case. In addition, the type and strength of the evidence supporting each case also varies: from 
word of mouth (hearsay) to direct personal conversations with one or more individuals directly or 
indirectly involved in the case, to newspaper articles, technical reports and other publications. Because of 
this intrinsic data variability, we will now briefly present each of the cases following their order in Table 
2.
2
                                                      
1 We consciously avoid using the names of the stakeholders who met with us, but the list of organizations can be obtained 
from the authors.  
2 While the enumeration of global cases may appear a lengthy exercise, the nature and variability of the data requires a 
sufficiently thorough explanation of each case.  
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Table 2. List of reported cases  
Source: Authors based on cited sources (see below). 
Types of sources: A, word of mouth; B, personal conversation(s); C, newspaper article(s); D, report(s) or other publication(s). 
Note: n.a. means not available or uncertain, UAE stands for United Arabic Emirates.  
Country  Product(s)   Year  Alleged commercial risk  Policy decision under influence  Source * 
Australia  GM canola   2007  Exports of canola and lamb to Japan/EU countries  State release of GM canola  C,D 
Australia  GM wheat  2008  Exports to Japan  Pre-emptive dissuasion to reject GM wheat  C 
Brazil  GM soybean   2007  Exports to Great Britain  Approval of new GM soybean?  B 
Canada/USA  GM potato   n.a.  Domestic market concerns by food companies  None, but influences other countries  A,B,C,D 
Canada/USA  GM wheat  2004  Exports of wheat to Europe/Japan  Canadian Wheat Board rejects GM wheat  A,D 
Egypt GM  potato    2001/2  Exports to Greece and EU  Commercialization rejected  A,B,D 
Egypt   GM crops  2005  Exports to Europe  Slowing application and/or future approval  C 
India  GM crops  2005  Exports to the EU  Mandatory labeling of GM food  C 
India  Organic   2005  Exports to Europe  Regulation of new GM crops  C 
India  GM rice   2006/8  Exports to Europe and the Middle East.  Possible slowing/deterring of field trials  A,B,C,D 
Indonesia  GM cocoa   2007  Exports to the United States  Push non-GM certification/deter research   B 
Kenya  GM tea   2007  Exports to the EU have to be non-GM  Pre-emptive action to dissuade any research  B 
Kenya  GM maize/cotton  2007  Exports of vegetables to the EU  Slow biosafety bill approval/field trials  B,C 
Malawi  GM food aid   2005  Imports of  non-GM food aid from the EU   No visible decision  A,B 
Malawi  GM maize/cotton  2005  Exports of groundnuts to the EU   Possible slowing of GM field trials  A,B 
Namibia  GM maize   2006  Meat exports to British / Norwegian supermarkets  Ban on GM maize imports  A,B,C,D 
New Zealand  GM yeast   2007  Wine exports  Ban on experiments  A,C,D 
Qatar/UAE  GM rice   2007  Imports from India  Encourage GM food labeling policy  C 
Russia  GM food  n.a.  Agricultural exports to the EU  Moscow GM-free  C 
South Africa  GM maize   2004/5  Meat export to the EU, maize exports in the region  No visible decision  B,C 
South Africa  GM yeast/vine  2007  Exports of wine  Rejected application   B,C,D 
South Africa  GM potato  2006/8  Export to Southern Africa  Commercialization decision stalled   B,C 
Tanzania  GM tobacco  2005  Exports to developed countries  Reported ban on GM tobacco trials  B 
Thailand  GM papaya   2005  Papaya and other fruit exports to EU and Japan  Moratorium on all GM field trials  C,D 
Thailand   GM rice   2006/8  Exports to Europe and others  Ban on experimentation and use of GM rice  C 
Uganda  GM cotton   n.a.  Exports of organic cotton  Request further analysis before trials  A 
US  GM sugarbeet   1998  Domestic market  None, but possible influence elsewhere  C 
US  GM rice  2004  Exports to Japan  Deter rice commercialization  D 
Vietnam  GM rice   2006/7  Exports to Europe and Japan  Ban on experimentation  B,C 
Zambia  GM maize  2002/7  Export of (organic) vegetables to Great Britain  Ban on food aid/imports with GM maize  A,B,C,D 




GM Canola and Wheat in Australia 
As the commercialization of GM canola was being discussed in Australia, there was a great deal of 
discussion regarding the potential commercial risk of such a decision. Goodman Fielder, Australia’s 
largest food company, and Tatiara Meats, the largest lamb exporter, called for the government to extend 
their bans on GM canola (ABC 2007) for another five years based on the fear of losing exports and the 
need to maintain the no-hormone, no-GM standard (ABC 2007).  
The Biological Farmers’ Association stated that allowing GM canola would result in Australia 
losing its export markets and lucrative GM-free status (North Queensland Register 2007). This statement 
was in contrast to several research reports published by the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and 
Resource economics (ABARe) showing the high opportunity cost of a ban on GM canola (Lewis 2007, 
Reuters 2008).  
Consumer and farmer groups representing 155 Japanese organizations presented a petition to the 
state government officials of South Australia, Victoria and New South Wales, asking them to maintain a 
moratorium on GM crops (Farm Weekly 2007). Their stand was based on the desire of Japanese 
companies to continue sourcing GM-free canola and canola oil from Australia. Because canola oil from 
GM canola is not required to be labeled as GM in Japan (or Australia), GM-free private standards govern 
the demand for GM canola in Japan. Despite these active lobbying campaigns, some Australian states 
passed an ordinance lifting the moratorium on GM crops, allowing farmers to grow GM canola. This 
reportedly encouraged Japan to cancel their export order for GM-free canola from Australia (North 
Queensland Register 2007). 
In 2008, the first reported results of Australian research on drought-tolerant GM wheat prompted 
some trade-related reactions by importers. The Flour Millers Association of Japan was quick to announce 
that they would not purchase wheat from Australia if GM wheat were planted in the country (Takada 
2008).  
GM Soybeans in Brazil 
In a report published in 2005, the British Retail Consortium (BRC) called on Brazilian soy producers to 
plant less GM soybean to maintain greater share of non-GM soy in the fields (GM-freeze 2005). The BRC 
statement came just before crops were to be planted for the next season, causing a dilemma for numerous 
farmers about whether to plant their fields with GM or non-GM soy.  
GM Potatoes and Wheat in Canada and the United States 
In 1997, a GM potato developed by Monsanto was commercialized and planted at a relatively small scale 
in Canada and the US (McCoy 2008). In 1999, following requests from consumer organizations, some of 
the largest potato-purchasing food companies (e.g., McDonalds and McCain) decided to avoid the use of 
GM potatoes, with the result that the technology was shelved. Although this avoidance did not directly 
affect policy decisions in Canada and US, it reportedly impacted Egypt and perhaps other countries that 
subsequently rejected applications for GM potatoes.  
In 2004, Round-up-resistant wheat was developed by Monsanto and approved by US regulation 
agencies, but the company then voluntarily withheld the strain from commercialization, due in part to 
wheat growers’ fears of losing export demand from Europe. Although this might appear to have been the 
company’s own decision, it was largely underpinned by a decision of the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB), 
which rejected the GM variety, thereby preventing Monsanto from achieving its goal of marketing the 
new wheat variety in both the US and Canada (Berwald et al. 2006). Thus, while the ultimate decision 
was made by the company based on traders’ interests, it was largely prompted by the CWB’s decision, 




GM Potatoes and Other Crops in Egypt 
In Egypt since 1990, the Agricultural Genetic Engineering Research Center (AGERI), under the aegis of 
the Agricultural Research Center (ARC), has sought to develop GM crops capable of overcoming 
problems such as insect infestation, drought, and raised soil salinity (Krauss 2005). One such crop, 
developed with international partners in 1999, was a GM potato variety that proved resistant to the potato 
tuber moth. This GM potato underwent field trials but was not commercially released, for fear of losing 
Egypt’s exports to Greece and other countries of the EU (USDA 2006). Interestingly, the GM potato 
variety in question was very different from the variety exported from Egypt to the EU. Despite this 
important distinction and some debate, decision makers decided not to go ahead with commercialization 
of the GM potato, reportedly for fear of losing market access to the EU. According to a source, this 
decision had no clear scientific basis, but instead seemed mainly political. The press-reported public 
decision of McDonald’s to reject the use of GM potatoes for French fries in the US likely played a role. 
Egyptian traders may also have influenced this decision. In any case, the GM potato project was 
discontinued in 2001-02 (Serageldin and Juma, 2007).  
In addition to potatoes, other GM crops under development in Egypt (e.g., cotton and corn) have 
also been subject to official rejection based on fear of losing exports to Europe (Krauss 2005). 
GM Rice and Other Crops in India 
Rice exporters in India supported a ban on GM rice for fear of losing their GM-free export markets 
(Bangkok Post 2006a, The Hindu 2006, Sharma 2006). They were the first to denounce field trials of GM 
rice in India, arguing that these trials would create economic losses (Parsai 2006, The Hindu 2008). The 
traders and associated organizations claimed that segregation is infeasible, and that if GM rice were 
approved, India would lose all its market access to Europe (Economic Times 2005). Following the escape 
of unapproved LL601 rice from the US in 2006, which resulted in intense testing of rice in Europe 
(Fletcher 2006), rice exporters reiterated their claim that the introduction of GM rice would result in the 
loss of all rice exports. Although GM rice has not yet been approved in India, these issues likely 
contributed to slowing and potentially even deterring new field trials of GM rice in this country.  
Organic exporters have also been warned by several observers that if India were to release GM 
crops, their access to Europe would be compromised (Kumar 2005, The Hindu 2006).  A number of pro-
organic groups oppose GM crops on many grounds, but their main points seem to revolve around trade 
interests and their perception that it is completely impossible for GM and non-GM crops to coexist 
(Sharma 2005). Anti-GM NGOs in India have also argued that the government should adopt a mandatory 
labeling policy for GM food, in order to preserve their exports to the EU ( Financial Times 2005), which 
is one of the few regions that has introduced and effectively enforced a mandatory labeling policy (Gruère 
and Rao 2007).  
GM Cocoa in Indonesia 
After publication of the first lab experiments on GM cocoa, an association of US importers asked for 
clarification regarding the GM status of cocoa exported from Indonesia.
3 Subsequently, the Indonesian 
Directorate General of Agricultural Processing and Marketing requested the research institution working 
on GM cocoa to build capacity for non-GM certification of cocoa. This request was very surprising given 
that no transgenic cocoa had reached the field, and the lab experiments were being conducted on calli, a 
material that is not easily regenerated into a plantlet. This case shows how quickly companies respond to 
the possible presence of GM trials, through their connections with government entities.  
                                                      




GM Products in Kenya 
Several different GM crops have been debated in Kenya. During discussions surrounding field trials of 
GM maize, several groups mentioned the fear of losing agricultural exports to the EU. The organization 
African Nature Stream warned the Kenyan Agricultural Research Institute (KARI), which is in charge of 
conducting confined field trials for GM maize, that GM trials would eliminate Kenya’s export markets 
(Masava 2005). The Kenya Small Scale Farmer Forum also said that farmers stand to lose the EU market 
should Kenya commercialize any GM crops. Furthermore, the Kenya Organic Agriculture Network 
(KOAN) and Consumer Info Network (CIN) have pushed for a ban of GM production. They have been 
vocal in their opposition to a biosafety bill that would pave the way for a biosafety regulatory system in 
Kenya, arguing that it would negatively impact trade (Mbaria 2008) and encourage the “dumping” of GM 
food rejected in other countries into Kenya (Amungo 2007).  
The export loss arguments used by the KOAN and its associates do not seem to be easily 
justifiable. Biologically speaking, it is quite difficult to find a rational explanation to support the argument 
that planting Bt cotton (insect resistant cotton), affects organic green beans, or that growing Bt maize 
could decrease the export of organic orchids. Part of this argument may be due to a general lack of 
understanding about market issues. In view of the absence of commercialization of any single GM 
vegetable in all countries, it is unlikely that a developing company would target Kenya (an exporting 
country to Europe and a small domestic market) as their major target for investment and 
commercialization of GM vegetables.  
Lastly, Kenyan tea exporters have been requested by EU buyers to provide official certificates 
from the Kenyan Phytosanitary Agency (KEPHIS) stating that the exported tea is not GM, although there 
has never been any research on GM tea in Kenya. Even if this requirement does not have any policy 
implications, it demonstrates the spread of standards above and beyond regulations. In a rational sense, 
this request may have been introduced to prevent the future use of GM tea. However, even this 
justification is not very convincing. No market-aware company or research institute would ever invest in 
research and development in Kenya the GM variety of a major crop exported to countries opposed to GM 
crops.  
GM Food Aid and Groundnut Exports in Malawi 
The EU, in their agreement to provide funding for food aid to Malawi, requested that the food aid not 
contain GM grains. Although this decision did not involve the private sector per se, it may have 
contributed to the reluctance of Malawi to import or use GM maize in the aftermath of the food-aid crisis 
of 2002. In addition, outside observers suggested that in 2002, high-level officials feared that Malawi 
could lose their groundnut exports to Europe if GM maize or other transgenic crops were introduced. 
Although most groundnut exports are directed to South Africa, some may be re-exported to Europe, 
potentially explaining (at least partially) why Malawi rejected trials of GM maize in 2002.  
GM Maize Imports in Namibia  
Namibia exports high-value beef both within the Southern Africa region and to Europe.
4 Every possible 
effort has been made to ensure that Namibian beef exports qualify with the highest standards of safety and 
quality, to satisfy high-income consumers in Europe. In particular, a full traceability system is in place, 
beef producers use natural feeds and maintain no-hormone policies, and the country has been literally cut 
in two by a veterinary fence, to avoid animal disease contamination.  
Against this background, there is a strict ban of GM maize imports (Africa News 2005), 
reportedly set up to keep GM maize out of cattle feed. This decision, explicitly supported by the 
Namibian Meat Board, may have been driven by Tesco, a UK-based retail chain that is a large buyer of 
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Namibian beef, or by other companies in the UK and/or Norway.
5 According to Paarlberg (2008, p 135), 
in 2000, one or more European companies stopped importing beef from Namibia upon learning that the 
animals had been fed yellow GM maize. This event may have been the trigger for the import ban. 
However, our meetings with stakeholders and the lack of a clear Tesco policy on beef (see Table 1), failed 
to confirm that buyer requirements were the sole reason for banning imports of GM maize. Since GM-
free private standards are likely to be driven by supply and demand considerations, the ban was probably 
intended to satisfy the preference of European retail chains, and  helped maintain market access in 2000, 
but also to help Namibian beef keep its high-quality reputation in the eyes of GM-averse European 
buyers.  
As a result, Namibia has enforced a strict moratorium on GM maize (Graig 2001). Yet, the 
relevance of this public policy decision does not seem to be supported by the evidence. While part of the 
decision was because the GM food regulations are still not yet in place, the central role of Namibian Meat 
Board in supporting this position seems to suggest the use of policy to satisfy purely commercial interests. 
If the entirety of the industry and all sectors of the population support the ban, such a decision would 
appear publicly legitimate.
6 However, several elements provide arguments showing that this is not the 
case. First, a large part of the chicken and ostrich feed industry has reported that it would welcome 
imports of cheaper mixed (GM and non-GM) maize, particularly given that the price of maize doubled 
between 2006 and 2008. Second, although maize is used to feed cattle in Namibia, the actual share of 
yellow maize in the total animal feed is extremely low. The Namibian cattle intended for high-value 
export, are by definition grass-fed. In comparison, other animal subsectors use much more maize feed. 
Third, banning GM maize import to avoid the risk of it being fed to export-bound cattle presumes that 
segregation of imports is infeasible, and that all (or at least a large share of) exports would actually be lost 
upon the importation of GM maize. However, a government-ordered cost-benefit analysis conducted in 
2002 on the use of GMOs in Namibian agricultural products found that there was a maximum threat of 
losing 1% of sale revenues due to export value loss, should Namibian cattle feed upon GM maize 
(Namibia Resource Consultants 2002). The study also concluded that segregating GM and non-GM maize 
could be feasible. Fourth, a very large share of all meat sold in the EU has been fed with GM soybeans 
and/or GM maize. Therefore, even if Namibia were to feed their cattle with a very small potential share of 
GM maize, the meat should still be able to enter the EU market.
7  
GM Yeast and Vines in New Zealand 
New Zealand wine is valued for its image of purity, and the wine industry in New Zealand has excluded 
the use of any GM ingredients. In 2003, the International Organization of Wine and Vine (OIV) formally 
adopted a position dissuading the use of biotechnology in commercial production of wine, until 
consumers demand it. Consequently, winemakers from Australia and New Zealand have decided that no 
GM vines or other GM ingredients will be used to produce wines until it is acceptable for consumers in 
their export markets. The international brands have all dissociated themselves from GM wines, so the 
potential pioneering of GM wines would irreversibly change the pioneering country’s image, and could 
compromise the future of the wine industry.  
GM Imports in Qatar and the United Arabic Emirates (UAE) 
Several news articles in Qatar reported the campaign by an anti-GM organization calling for the labeling 
of GM food based on the fear that rice imported from India could be GM (e.g., Landais 2007). As noted 
above, India conducted confined field trials of GM rice, but has not approved the commercialization of 
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buyers in Norway.  
6 Even if potentially inconsistent with its obligations under the World Trade Organization. 





any GM rice variety to date. A similar fear-mongering campaign against rice imports from India was 
reported in the United Arabic Emirates (AME Info 2007).  
General GM Policies in Russia  
Russia has made clear statements about its willingness to avoid GM introduction, in an effort to reduce 
the risk of trade loss with the EU. The city of Moscow even implemented a “voluntary” GM-free policy, 
possibly mimicking those seen in selected cities, regions and countries of the EU. These moves do not 
seem to be based on genuine consumer demand (Kilner 2007). 
Various GM Products in South Africa  
South Africa is the only country with commercialized GM crops. In the last few years, GM cotton, maize, 
and soybeans have all been grown in South Africa (Gruère and Sengupta 2008). Reports have noted that 
South African traders have had difficulty exporting GM maize because the importers fear retaliation from 
EU buyers (e.g., like in the case of beef exports from Namibia or food aid to Zambia). Meat and dairy 
exporters have also expressed concerns that their products would not reach the EU if the animals are fed 
GM maize, despite the fact that most cattle in the EU are fed GM soybeans.  
Other products have also been the subject of market- and trade-related concerns. A GM potato 
developed in a public-private partnership faced several concerns from the industry, despite being designed 
for small-scale non-commercial use (Kahn 2008). Opposing NGOs say that introduction of GM potatoes 
will result in trade losses (Africa News Network 2008).The Pick-N’Pay supermarket chain was reported 
to have stated that it would not sell any GM potato. Verification with a representative, however, indicated 
that the media reports appear to have been exaggerated; the company only said that it would not sell the 
potato until it was approved by the relevant regulatory authorities (Gruère and Sengupta 2008). 
Nonetheless, this case made noise, and others in the food and restaurant industries reported concerns 
regarding this GM potato. In a recent decision, the wine industry of South Africa also decided to reject the 
use of GM yeast and pushed the GMO executive council to reject such an application, in an effort to 
remain GM-free and keep all markets open (Benton 2008).  
GM Tobacco in Tanzania  
 A Tanzanian scientist reported in 2005 that efforts to develop a GM tobacco were stopped due to the fear 
of tobacco export losses. When investigating this, we found that Vector Tobacco, a US company, had 
conducted field trials for a low-nicotine GM tobacco. In 2002-2003, GM tobacco was grown on 60-100 
acres. However, the company actually went bankrupt, and backers realized that the demand for low-
nicotine tobacco was not sufficient to guarantee a return on additional investment. Therefore, even if the 
rumored threat reached the ears of decision makers, it does not appear to have been a primary cause of the 
project’s cessation.  
GM Papaya and Rice in Thailand  
Papaya is one of Thailand’s primary agricultural exports, comprising of 25% of the country’s exports and 
earning US $78.69 million in 2005. The major importers of Thai papaya are the US, Japan and Canada 
(Greenpeace 2006). Research on papaya has been carried out since the mid-1990s, in an effort to develop 
a variety tolerant to the papaya ringspot virus. In 2004, there were reports of possible gene escape out of 
GM papaya field trials to conventional papaya growers (Bangkok Post 2006b). This had an immediate 
effect on papaya exports from Thailand. A number of supermarkets rejected papaya shipments, including 
Tesco, Carrefour and a prominent German food distributor (Sukin and Sirisunthorn 2004). Some traders 
even called for the destruction of potentially GM papaya trees. At least ten fruit exporters complained that 
their processed papaya exports to various European countries were delayed or rejected due to fears of 




of sweet corn, baby corn, tomatoes, and other food products would be eventually affected, adding that it 
would be better if the Thai Department of Agriculture called off the ongoing field trial of GM papaya and 
moved to clarify the government policy on GMOs. These pressures encouraged the government to 
institute a temporary ban on field testing GM crops. Since then, organic exporter groups have supported 
prolongation of the ban. In 2007, the Thai organic agricultural association, which groups exporters of 
various organic products, publicly opposed the removal of the ban on GM crop field trials, arguing that, 
“Allowing field testing of GM crops is wrong and would ruin the export of Thai farm products to major 
European and Japanese markets” (Eyre 2007).  
The case of rice differs, as the restriction of GM rice in Thailand was motivated by preemptive 
rather than reactive considerations. In 2006, at a time when US rice was banned from many countries for 
the risk of having GM traces, Thai rice exporters announced their decision to ban the use of any GM rice 
in order to gain competitive shares and access to the EU market. This decision encouraged the 
government to stay out of research and development on GM rice, as witnessed by the adoption of a GM-
free clause in the Thailand 2007-2011 rice strategic plan (Thai News Agency 2008). The exporters have 
also been keen to ensure that no GM rice is used in Thailand. In March 2008, the Foreign Trade 
Department Director-General declared that, contrary to a published report, no exported Thai jasmine rice 
was GM. In June 2008, the Thai Rice Farmers Association asked the Thai government to test suspect 
second-season rice allegedly produced by a large investment group potentially representing foreign 
interests, for fear that it could be GM and therefore affect Thai rice exports (Pungpao 2008).  
Organic Cotton in Uganda  
In Uganda, Bt cotton trials were initially not approved, reportedly at least in part because of trade-related 
issues and concerns regarding access to the EU market. The Cotton Development Organization (CDO), 
which grows organic cotton, vocally opposed Bt cotton trials and use, arguing that it may adversely affect 
cotton premiums abroad. However, Uganda recently moved toward approving Bt cotton, conditional on 
an ex-ante assessment of the economic effects it could have on the industry.  
GM Rice and Sugarbeets in the United States 
US rice exporters opposed the approval of herbicide-tolerant varieties due to fear of losing exports 
(Pollak, 2007). Despite its expected benefits (Bond, Carter and Farzin 2005), GM rice was particularly 
opposed by California-based exporters, who believed it could compromise access to the highly requiring 
Japanese market.  
Herbicide-resistant GM sugarbeets were not released initially due to opposition from major 
buying companies (e.g., Mars and Hershey’s) that feared consumer resistance and preferred to remain 
GM-free (Pollack 2007).
8 However, the situation changed in 2008 with many multi-national companies 
operating in the US becoming more positive about the use of GM ingredients in their food products. 
American Crystal Sugar, the largest processor of sugarbeets, feels that consumers have now come to 
accept GM sugar. Similar sentiments were voiced by a spokeswoman Kellogg’s, who mentioned that they 
have not had any issues from GM sugar. Neither case had any direct implication on policies, but they do 
demonstrate the ability of private standards by major food companies to affect the commercial release of 
GM technologies, even in a country that does not require the labeling of GM products.  
GM Rice in Vietnam 
In 2006, the Vietnam Food Association and Thai rice exporters announced their decision to ban the use of 
any GM rice, in order to maintain access to the EU and Japanese markets (Wipatayotin 2006). While the 
decision of these semi-public entities was not a public policy, it prompted the two countries to avoid 
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research and approval of future GM rice trials. In 2007, the Vietnamese government reportedly received a 
warning letter from a major rice importer in France that commercialization of GM rice would have 
negative impacts on rice exports to the EU. 
Food Aid and Exports in Zambia  
During the Zambian famine of 2001-02, Zambian officials told US officials that they were concerned that 
accepting food aid potentially containing GM maize could jeopardize their exports of green beans to the 
EU. Several outside observers confirmed that Zambia’s rejection of potentially GM-containing food aid 
during the crisis (and GM maize imports thereafter) was partly due to fears of losing exports to the EU 
(Cauvin 2002, Bergstrøm 2007). According to Paarlberg (2008, p 135), during the crisis in 2002, 
executives of Agriflora, a Zambian trading company that exported certified organic vegetables to the UK, 
received a phone call from a British supermarket warning that their exports of baby corn would be in 
jeopardy if GM food aid was accepted. In response to that, Agriflora asked Zambian President Levy 
Mwanasa to reject the food aid. The Zambian government rejected the GM food aid and later noted that 
exports of organic baby corn and honey in particular, and organic food in general, were potentially at risk 
(Government of Zambia 2002). Bergstrøm (2007) also notes that the potential introduction of GM maize 
in Zambia would have triggered the risk of restricting exports of beef to the EU, Japan and other GM-
regulating nations. The Zambian National Farmers Union, a group dominated by export-oriented 
commercial farmers who sell baby corn, honey and tobacco to the EU, has supported the  Zambian GMO 
ban of 2002 (Robinson 2003, cited in Paarlberg 2008, p 136).  
GM Maize Imports in Zimbabwe  
Zimbabwe reportedly rejected GM food aid in 2002 in part because it feared that accepting GM shipments 
might cause the country to lose its meat markets in the EU. We also found a possible- although 
unconfirmed- link between Zimbabwe’s opposition to GM maize import/use and fears regarding 
agricultural and horticultural exports (including green beans) to the EU at a time when Zimbabwe was a 





4.  DISENTANGLING IRRATIONAL FEARS FROM REAL COMMERCIAL RISKS 
Characterization of Cases: From Linkages to Risk Categories 
Our global review of cases helps us evaluate the conceptual framework proposed in section 3 and shown 
in Figure 1. In particular, we find that each of the five identified actors (supermarkets in importing 
countries, traders, organic producers, NGOs and local supermarkets) may have had partial influences on 
decision making in at least one of the cases identified herein. However, it is clear that the role, 
importance, and scope of influence of each actor largely vary across cases. We do not find conclusive 
evidence that importing companies interact directly with policy makers, although they may take positions 
that indirectly affect policy making. Instead, most cases show the prominent role of local trader groups. 
Organic groups and NGOs appear to play similar roles, sharing views and sometimes campaigns in 
opposition of GM products (often based on commercial arguments). Lastly, local supermarkets or food 
companies do not seem to play a significant role in developing countries, but they can be influential in 
developed countries with labeling policies.  
While only some cases reveal a causal relationship between the identified stakeholders and 
visible policy decisions, most provide evidence that decisions are potentially influenced by claimed 
commercial risks related to private GM-free policies. A few cases involve lobbying actions by trade 
interest groups against a legislative or parliamentary decision (e.g., the biosafety bill in Kenya, labeling 
regulations in the Middle-East and India), where several other situations appear to have influenced 
discrete regulatory decisions, such as restrictions on confined field trials, banning of GM imports, or the 
acceptance/rejection of food aid potentially containing GM products.  
The type of standards and the targeted products also vary. In some cases, GM-free private 
standards appear to encourage decisions on products targeted by those standards. However, we also find 
cases where the product under consideration by policy makers is not fully related to the products being 
exported to GM-free markets. We find one case where the private standard exceeds the regular quality 
standard of the importing market (GM-free fed meat from Namibia), and another case where an official 
standard is set for a product that is completely GM-free (Kenyan tea).  
Next, we separate the cases based on the validity or nature of the alleged commercial risks. More 
specifically, we identify three types of commercial risks: unproven risks, potential risks, and real risks.
9 
Cases associated with unproven risks include real but manageable risks (e.g., GM potatoes in Egypt) and 
irrational or nonexistent risks (e.g., GM tea, maize, and cotton in Kenya). Cases facing potential risks 
have the potential for export loss (present or future), and are more generally associated with uncertainty 
regarding the presence or scope of the risk and/or its manageability. This second category includes cases 
with risks that require more information for their classification as real or unproven. Lastly, cases with real 
risk are those wherein a particular industry has a GM-sensitive market and would actually stand to lose 
part or all of this market upon adoption of GM crops or products. This group includes large exporters that 
are likely to face important losses if they do not consider commercial risks. Table 3 divides the cases 
according to these categories.  
Interestingly, Table 3 shows that most African cases are included in the first category, while most 
Asian or developed-country cases fall in the two other categories. This discrepancy across regions 
underlines the differences in situations; many African decision makers on biotechnology are not 
knowledgeable with regard to market-related issues. Furthermore, they tend to be more dependent on (but 
also more influenced by) export considerations, especially as related to their market access to Western 
Europe.  
 
                                                      
9 In this categorization, the term “risk” refers both to the presence of a possible economic loss (defined as exposure*hazard) 
in a classical sense, but also the degree to which the risk is manageable. For instance, facing a real risk implies that there is no 




Table 3. Categorization of selected cases by type of risk 
Risk category  Cases 
Unproven risks  Australia (GM canola), Egypt (GM potatoes), Malawi (GM maize/cotton), Indonesia 
(GM cocoa), Kenya (GM maize/cotton), Kenya (GM tea), Namibia (GM maize), Qatar & 
UAE (GM rice), Russia (GM food), Tanzania (GM tobacco), Zambia (GM maize), 
Zimbabwe (GM maize),  
Potential risks  Australia (GM wheat), Brazil (GM soybeans), Canada & US (GM wheat), India (GM 
rice), Uganda (GM cotton), South Africa (GM potato), Thailand (GM papaya), US (GM 
sugarbeet). 
Real risks  New Zealand (GM yeast), Thailand and Vietnam (GM rice), US (GM rice).  
Source: Authors. 
More generally, the usefulness of this categorization is found in its application, whereby the type 
of risk determines the relevance of the issue and its policy response. As such, this division can be 
interpreted as a “traffic light”: cases based on unproven risks require no particular attention (green light), 
potential risk cases require additional information (yellow light), and real risk cases require responses (red 
light). We will now focus on identifying factors that can explain why some policy decisions are made 
based on unproven risks, and use these factors to help separate out real risk cases from the rest.  
From Unproven Risks to Political Influence: Two Critical Presumptions 
We find that virtually all reported cases in the unproven risk category, as well as many cases in the 
potential risk category, are based on two basic underlying assumptions. The first assumption is that 
segregation of GM crops from non-GM crops is infeasible. The conflict among animal feed sub-sectors, 
the insistence of organic producers to avoid any GM approval, and even the fear of losing export markets 
if any GM is approved, fails to hold if non-GM products can be segregated for export. Assuming that 
segregation is absolutely infeasible prompts the fear that the conventional products will cease to be 
produced if a GM variety is approved (or even tested). In fact, segregation is not always feasible or easy. 
However, it may be possible to segregate non-GM products when the exports are already subject to 
multiple quality and safety checks. Then, the issue becomes a question of who bears the cost. Several 
exporting countries use segregation systems and sell both GM and non-GM products. For example, the 
US, Brazil, South Africa, and Spain all produce, consume, and/or export both GM and non-GM products, 
while China segregates imported GM soybeans. 
As part of an email conversation, a representative from Marks & Spencer, a major supermarket 
chain in the UK, noted that the company is willing to continue trading with a partner who develops or 
uses a GM product different from the one they purchase. Even if the technology is adopted for the same 
exported crop, the company would still consider maintaining a purchasing channel, on a case-by-case 
basis, after close inspection of the efficacy of the segregation process. This underlines the relatively open-
mindedness of certain companies in facing the real-world marketing constraints of having both GM and 
non-GM markets, and may also suggest that in some cases, the traders (not the supermarkets) may 
actually be the ones most actively avoiding the introduction of GM products, in an effort to avoid having 
to implement segregation systems.  
The second assumption which underlies the cases of private standards reported in this paper is the 
idea amongst traders in developing countries that current markets in Europe (and Japan in some cases) 
are the only markets for exports. It is true that these markets are largely opposed to GM products, 
meaning that (under this rationale) there is a very limited scope for trade if a country engages in GM 
products. However, a number of countries in Asia as well as some emerging markets in the Middle-East 
either do not discriminate between GM and non-GM products, or  do not have the very high marketing 




markets, they would not only expand their export base, but they would be able to strengthen their 
bargaining power with European buyers.  
Although neither of these two assumptions is generally valid, they form the basis of the perceived 
(but in fact speculative or future) risks in most of the countries examined herein. There are only a few 
examples of countries finding alternatives to these traditional mindsets. South Africa successfully 
segregates between GM and non-GM maize for their exports to Zimbabwe and Namibia, with a certain 
portion of the cost being transmitted to the buyer. Also, South Africa, Kenya and some other countries 
have recently begun discussing the exploration of other, less GM-stringent markets in Asia and the 
Middle-East.  
In addition to these two critical assumptions, we find that two other factors related to market 
imperfections are key in the diffusion of unproven commercial risks in developing countries: the presence 
of multiple information asymmetries and risk aversion among key actors having skewed perceptions of 
market power. We will explore these two issues in the next subsections. 
The Role of Information Asymmetries 
We find two types of information asymmetries that potentially affect our cases: those between the 
importer and local actors, and those between the policy makers and local or outside actors. Although both 
can result in confusion, misunderstandings, and bad decisions, we argue here that the second type of 
asymmetry can prove more damaging to the country involved.  
Policy makers in developing countries looking to establish an export market in the EU often have 
access to only scattered information about the GM production statuses and national regulations governing 
the trade of GM products in these countries. This incomplete information feeds into the overwhelming 
belief that Europe is totally free of GM crops. This idea may be perpetuated by the failure of importers to 
acknowledge that several countries within Europe currently grow GM crops for animal feed. Information 
asymmetry is also propagated through the fact that while the importing-country supermarkets have 
comprehensive information about the various laws in the developing countries they source from, the 
exporting countries largely rely on information provided to them by their importers. These information 
asymmetries often work in favor of the European importers, who may seek to coerce the developing-
country exporter to oppose legislation that might bring GM products into the country.  
In support of this, we note that during our meetings, a number of exporters and many NGO 
representatives (who were vehemently in favor of remaining GM-free) were not aware that the EU was 
using GM crops and importing GM products, or that it had a threshold level of 0.9% for accidental co-
mingling of GM content in non-GM or even organic products. Many of them also ignored the fact that 
most of the meat sold in the EU is fed with GM-containing feeds. For example, a representative of the 
Kenya Biodiversity Coalition said in the press that Kenya should not promote GMO, knowing that the 
“EU does not even allow cattle to eat [GM products]” (The Nation 2007). This is completely untrue in 
view of the millions of tons of GM soybeans that are imported by the EU from Latin American countries 
for use in animal feed. 
We also met with traders who were aware of the EU regulatory system and knew that Europe was 
not entirely GM-free; however, these traders often said that they would still maintain the GM-free status 
of their exports in order to satisfy the buyers. Therefore, even if information asymmetries play a 
significant role in tilting trade terms in favor of the European buyers, this effect should not be 
generalized. In fact, it is not clear that the actors would behave differently if these asymmetries were 
removed. Surely, better information would provide additional bargaining power for suppliers in 
developing countries, allowing them to plead for equitable treatment during the imposition of private 
standards for exports. It could also encourage them to refine their arguments. However, increased 
information would not necessarily result in a change of action if exporters are still subject to GM-free 
standards.  
The informational advantage of special interest groups over policy makers may be more 




biosafety and biotechnology policies tend to have at least a basic knowledge of (if not an expertise in) the 
scientific issues related to the use of transgenic crops and/or their possible consequences for health and 
ecosystems. In some biosafety systems, agriculture specialists are included in decision making; however, 
most systems rely on specialists in the Ministry of Environment or the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (or their equivalents). In any case, most key decision makers on agricultural biotechnology 
are scientists rather than specialists in agricultural markets or trade. As a consequence, these commissions 
tend to have limited knowledge about markets and trade-related issues. For instance, it is striking that 
country representatives at meetings of the Biosafety Protocol (essentially a trade agreement on the 
movements of GM organisms) are largely uninterested in and unaware of the trade-related consequences 
of their regulatory decisions. With this patent lack of knowledge, a rumor on trade risk can be perceived 
as a fact, and decisions may be influenced by information  campaigns led by advocacy groups focusing on 
trade-related issues -that are often based on “cherry-picked” bibliographies- can be very influential on 
decisions (Macan-Markar 2008). In addition, recognition of their own relative ignorance can make these 
decision makers more open to any expertise, even that coming from groups with clear political goals. 
Although they might be skeptical about a statement on commercial risks, decision makers may prefer to 
take a precautionary stance, thinking that no risk is better than some risk. This leads to the second 
important factor- risk aversion.  
Market Power and Risk Aversion  
Risk aversion can be defined in several ways. In our context, we define it as the behavior of specific 
economic agents who, when considering options on an action with uncertain outcomes, prefer to 
minimize risk even if such action goes against rational expectations and will likely result in welfare (or 
opportunity) losses.    
In reviewing our cases, we find evidence that certain traders, particularly in developing countries, 
may be risk-averse in their relationship with buyers, blindly complying with buyers’ requirements, often 
despite the costs these standards may imply. The perceived or actual market power of buyers accentuates 
this phenomenon. In our interactions with the various exporters in Kenya, Namibia and South Africa, we 
clearly find that exporters see themselves as small players in a big market dominated by the large buyers 
(e.g., the supermarket chains of Europe). Because they perceive themselves as facing a monopsony, 
traders prefer to obey any type of requirement (even absurd ones). Our discussions in Kenya showed that 
many traders actually acknowledge the possibility of contacting other buyers if standards go too far. This 
could be a sensible strategy, especially if these traders represent a significant share of the global supply, 
as in the case of Kenyan tea. However, the traders also think they could lose everything to a hypothetical 
competitor if they reject a demand of the importer, and prefer to avoid this risk. As a consequence, their 
risk-averse behavior results in the adoption of any requested production standards, even those that exceed 
any production standard in the targeted developed country.  
Risk aversion can also be found among policy makers. Although we do not have specific factual 
evidence for this, a number of elements lead us to believe that some decision makers have demonstrated 
risk-averse behavior in avoiding or delaying a decision based on limited or sometimes even nonexistent 
commercial risks, in an effort to avoid any potential consequence. Several studies have sought to quantify 
how much export of non-GM crops would be lost by selected African countries if they were to adopt GM 
crops and lose their agricultural exports to the EU (Paarlberg 2006; Nielson et al. 2003). Even though 
these studies show that the projected loss would comprise only a small fraction of their total export trade, 
in-country sentiment seems to suggest otherwise. Within the export communities in these countries, 
losing a niche market is considered to have serious consequences, irrespective of the actual value of lost 
trade (even if it is completely negligible in value). This may be due to the perception, at least in certain 
African countries, that exports to Europe are extremely important. In some cases this goes against reason, 
with policy makers believing that it is better to keep a small volume of high-value exports to the stagnant 
EU food sector than to explore a larger export volume with more diverse export destinations in the 




ignorance of market conditions among policy makers means that any non-representative export or anti-
GM group could successfully lobby and alter a biosafety or biotechnology decision.  
The Egyptian government’s decision to discontinue the GM potato project may be an example of 
this type of behavior. Special interest groups, possibly traders, likely spread fears about the possible 
consequences that commercialization of GM potatoes could have on potato exports, even if the GM 
potato varieties would not be used by exporters and therefore would be very unlikely to pose a serious 
problem.  
From Critical Factors to Practical Decision Making: A Suggested Framework 
Even if natural risk aversion is difficult to reverse, we think that more and better information on real 
commercial risks could help policy makers arrive at better decisions for the benefit of their countries. For 
a benevolent and rational policy maker faced with a decision that has uncertain trade related outcomes, it 
would be very helpful to understand the nature, likelihood and amplitude of the risks. In this section, we 
propose a set of necessary questions to help decision makers determine whether they should make a direct 
yes/no decision, or require a more comprehensive assessment of the actual commercial risks and possible 
management strategies.  
Let us suppose that a decision has to be made on a GM product application (for confined use, 
field trial, planting, or import) and stakeholders are arguing that this decision would result in a significant 
risk of export loss. Table 4 lists five critical questions (italicized and numbered from Q1 to Q5) that 
should be answered to help clarify the nature, likelihood (exposure) and amplitude (hazard rate) of the 
claimed risk, if it can be avoided, and if avoiding this risk is a good or bad decision. These five questions, 
all answerable with a YES or NO, are designed to provide guidance to policymakers; they correspond to 
five necessary but not sufficient conditions for the presence of a real or serious commercial risk. Figure 2 
shows the suggested procedure that policy makers should follow to reach a decision. The process starts 
with question Q1 (on the left hand side of Figure 2) and then follows through to a clear determination of 
whether the risk is serious or not (right hand side of Figure 2).  








As shown in this figure, if the unambiguous response to all questions is YES, then the 
commercial risk is serious and could justify a rejection of the application. If, however, the answer to one 
of the five questions is a clear NO, the risk is not serious enough to require a negative decision in itself 
and, everything else being equal, the debate should be pursued. If one or more answers to these questions 
are ambiguous or undetermined, policy makers should ask for more information from the claimant or 
even command a more complete analysis of the situation.  
Table 4 also provides more detailed sub-questions and identifies the information needed to 
provide clear answers to the five questions. Under Q1, we list basic questions that can be used to help 
separate cases based on hearsay or rumors from actual arguable cases of potential risks. If no information 
can be obtained under these bullets, the case is not worth considering. Under Q2, a few clarifying 
Unsure 
No
Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5 
More information and/or analysis are needed 
before reaching a conclusion
Yes Yes  Ye Ye Yes
No No  No 
Unsure Unsure Unsure  Unsure





questions are designed to help reject possible ad-hoc cases, such as the risk of Bt cotton field trials 
affecting the export of vegetables. The sub-questions under Q3 aim to gather quantitative evidence of 
potential risks; without such evidence, any party could exaggerate the actual exports in question. The 
fourth category of questions (under Q4) directly addresses the two misleading presumptions present in 
virtually all unproven cases: the infeasibility of segregation and the lack of other market opportunities. 
The last set of questions (under Q5) is intended to help reduce the likelihood of risk-averse behavior by 
reminding decision makers to compare the risks and expected benefits of their decision.  
Table 4. Critical questions and detailed elements required for decision making 
Q1. Gathering basic information: Is the alleged risk substantiated? 
  Identify the claimant, the claim, the product(s) under alleged commercial risk, and the targeted foreign country. 
  Obtain basic information about the GM import regulations and production practices in the targeted country. 
Q2. Determining the degree of exposure: Are export losses likely with the decision? 
  Is the product targeted by the decision biologically or economically related to the product under presumed risk 
of export loss? 
Is the GM-free requirement voluntary or based on a country regulation?  
  If voluntary, is there substantial evidence of this requirement?  
  If mandatory, is there evidence that the target export country actually bans GM?  
  Is the product under decision currently exported to the target country? 
Are there other examples of cases where such decision has resulted in export losses? 
Does the decision directly compromise exports? Or is it only a hypothetical possibility? 
Q3. Determining the hazard rate: Are presumed export losses non-negligible for the country? 
  What is the volume and value of exports of the targeted product? 
  What is the share of these exports going to the sensitive country? 
  Is all the industry at risk or just a portion of it? What share of the industry is concerned?  
Q4. Considering plausible management solutions: Is the risk unavoidable? 
  Are there other buyers for this product on the same market? 
  If so, would these alternative buyers buy the product even with a decision? 
  Are there other markets where the product could be sold? 
  Is non-GM segregation feasible with the decision, at least for export? 
Q5. Consequence of renouncing to the decision: Is the risk greater than the benefits? 
  What are the benefits of going ahead with the decision? 
  What are the potential costs of rejecting the decision? 
  Would other actors in the industry benefit from the decision? If so how? 
Source: Authors 
Although this simplified and rational procedure may not include all possible questions about 
potential commercial risks, it can be used to effectively reject irrational or unsubstantiated cases, and 





5.  CONCLUSION 
Despite the rapid expansion of genetically modified (GM) crops over the past twelve years, these crops 
have been rejected by a number of countries. Apart from developed countries that have restricted the 
import, marketing, and use of GM products, many developing countries have stayed out of the debate, 
preferring to avoid the use of GM products for a number of reasons, including the risk of losing exports to 
countries with marketing restrictions and consumer opposition against GM products. At the same time, 
studies on the trade and economic implications of adopting GM crops in developing countries show that 
in many cases, these presumed commercial risks are absent or limited, and any export loss would be much 
smaller than the gains of adopting potentially productivity-enhancing GM crop technologies. 
In this paper, we investigate the discrepancy between real and perceived commercial risks for the 
use of GM products by diving into the political economy of GM food and international trade. We focus 
particularly on the effects of GM-free private standards set up by food companies in Europe and other 
food-importing countries on biotechnology and biosafety policy decisions in exporting developing 
countries. To do so, we review cases reported in news articles, publications and technical reports, or 
identified through interviews with international biotech specialists. We complement this review by 
analyzing several case studies based on visits to Kenya, Namibia and South Africa, undertaken in June 
2007. 
Overall, we found 31 cases where GM-free private standards may have interacted directly or 
indirectly with biosafety or biotechnology policy decisions in 21 countries. Because many of the cases 
rely on unpublicized lobbying activities, and because there is a general lack of comprehensive evidence, 
many cases do not provide straightforward evidence of causality links between importers/traders and 
policy decisions. However, by assembling the various pieces of evidence, we are able to obtain a 
relatively consistent framework of observed influential links among major actors at the confluence of 
policy makers and the supply chain.  
We find that although GM-free private standards and policies are set up by importing food 
companies (especially supermarkets in Europe), there is insufficient evidence to support the direct 
involvement of the companies in policy processes in African or Asian countries. However, these actors 
indirectly influence policy making via their local traders, who face the possibility of exclusion if they do 
not comply with the companies’ standards. Apart from the traders and associated producer groups in the 
exporting countries, organic producers and anti-GM nongovernmental organizations use the fear of export 
losses to support their case. Local supermarkets, which are the fifth group of actors we discuss herein, 
tend to have a very limited role in the debates in developing countries, even if they may be influential in 
exporting developed countries.  
We differentiate three types of risks among cases: real (or legitimate) commercial risks, potential 
(or uncertain) risks, and unproven (or irrational) risks. The separation of real risks from the two other 
categories is necessary to avoid misguided decisions. By comparing cases, we identify two critical yet 
misleading presumptions perpetuated by interest groups seeking to support the latter two categories of 
risk: the infeasibility of non-GM (or organic) product segregation, and the lack of  buyers or market 
opportunities other than the one requiring GM-free products. We also find that information asymmetries 
and risk-averse behaviors related to market perceptions play a role in inserting the mostly-unfounded 
export concerns into biosafety or biotechnology policy decisions. The results of our analysis are used to 
suggest a simple framework, based on five critical questions, to aid decision makers who are facing 
pressure to reject applications for GM crop testing, application, consumption or use, for fear of alleged 
export losses. 
The prominence of private standards in food trade and their capacity to dictate what products can 
access developed countries is neither new nor specific to products derived from modern agricultural 
biotechnology. Similarly, the observed political power of exporting producers to influence domestic 
policy decisions to satisfy their economic self-interest is also not new or GM-specific. However, the 




debate around the use of GM products makes this situation particularly unique and the source of 
unexpected and often seemingly irrational decisions. Rejecting a specific trial of an agricultural 
technology can be quite detrimental to a country in the medium- to long-run, especially if this technology 
addresses critical agronomic constraints and proves successful in other countries. Rejecting food aid that 
may contain GM elements for fear of export losses in a completely different and unrelated crop is a more 
worrisome decision that can directly affect the lives of at-risk individuals. In both cases, we feel that the 
use of basic information and the questions proposed herein can provide guidance to policymakers, with 
the hope of avoiding regrettable and costly decisions.  
While commercial risks are a legitimate concern for countries that largely depend on agriculture, 
they still differ considerably from the health and environmental risks potentially associated with the use 
of GM products, and should therefore be managed differently. Among other things, commercial risks do 
not face the same direct consequences, they are not as uncertain, and they are not irreversible. With this in 
mind, a “precautionary approach” to managing commercial risk is largely irrelevant. Commercial risks 
can be managed carefully, through gathering information and accounting for market uncertainties rather 
than prescribing a simple blanket ban on any decision that could hypothetically have long-term effects on 
possible future trade. Large uncertainties regarding the commercial consequences of a specific decision 
can most often be addressed by gathering more and better market information. 
Our global review of evidence has also shown the prominence of the European Union and its 
companies as leaders in the international governance of GM food, as manifested by their preference for 
GM-free products. However, several recent developments suggest that European opposition of GM 
products and their regulatory approach to risk may be bound to change. Although European consumers 
remain largely opposed to GM foods, politicians and food companies are starting to become more aware 
of the effects of the European opposition to GM products. European politicians have begun questioning 
the justification of European consumer preferences in view of their likely implications on African 
technology choices. For instance, the European Commission has become keen on adopting a positive 
tolerance level on unapproved GM products (European Commission 2007), and in 2007, the Danish 
Environment Minister voiced her concern that Europe may have had a negative effect on developing 
countries by imposing their standards on regulating GMOs (Friends of Europe 2007). In June 2008, the 
government of the United Kingdom openly questioned the national opposition to the use of GM crops, 
particularly with regard to the food price crisis (Crowley 2008; Grice and Mock 2008). In June 2008, 
Nestlé’s chairman, Peter Brabeck, took a public position in favor of GM noting that strict EU regulations 
were hurting African farmers (Devez 2008; Forbes 2008; Minder et al. 2008).  
The food price crisis has also altered the will of certain companies to avoid GM ingredients. In 
2008, for the first time, a number of importing food companies in South Korea and Japan, faced with the 
high prices of non-GM corn (e.g., $450/ton for non-GM corn in Korea, when regular corn could be 
purchased at $350/ton), decided to import GM corn for highly-processed products (Farms.com 2008, 
Moon 2008, Pollack 2008). These  countries may also be considering importing GM soybeans for food 
products (Nakashini 2008, Maeda 2008). Products based on these GM imports do not really contain 
detectable traces of GM, and are therefore exempt from labeling policies; however, the abandonment of 
GM-free private standards by these companies signals an economically-driven change of purchasing 
policies. This change could be reversed if more producers in exporting nations decide to return to non-
GM standards. However, the current market outlook suggests that exporting farmers may prefer to use 
potentially more productive GM crops to produce and sell more outputs at such a high price. It is yet 
unclear whether these private policy changes lead to a broader disappearance of GM-free private 
standards, and possibly to a change of mindset. Many consumers in these countries have sufficient 
income and willingness to pay to avoid GM products, meaning that such change may only be seen in the 
long run. 
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